This is a study of the representations of subjective expected utility preferences that admits state-dependent incompleteness, and subjective expected utility preferences displaying noncomparability of acts from distinct sources. The notions familiar events and sources are defined and characterized. The relation greater familiarity on sources and increasing familiairity of a source are also defined and characterized.
Introduction
In general, the representations of subjective expected utility theory with incomplete preferences have the form of multi-prior expected multi-utility. 1 The set of priors represents the incompleteness of beliefs and the set of utility functions that of tastes. Specific models admit complete preferences on a subset of acts leading to more restrictive representations. For example, in Bewley's (2002) model of Knightian uncertainty the restriction of the preference relation to constant acts is complete, giving rise to multi-prior expected utility representation. In Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) the axiom of complete beliefs implies that if the preference relation between bets and constant acts is complete then its representation takes the form of subjective expected multi-utility representation.
This paper explores the underlying structures of incomplete preference relations under uncertainty that are complete over distinct classes of acts. The motivation for this inquiry is the presumption that some classes of acts share features that make them more readily comparable, while acts belonging to distinct classes are not comparable.
To begin with I examine subsets of acts that agree outside a given event and display event-dependent incompleteness. The interest in this investigation stems from the perception that the conditional preferences may be incomplete due to lack of familiarity with the underlying events. Event unfamiliarity might impact the decision maker's confidence in his own tastes when facing a choice among acts that agree outside the said event. This type of situations is prevalent in medical decision making. Consider, for example, a person diagnosed as having prostate cancer and must choose between alternative treatments, say, surgery and radiation therapy. Suppose that the patient is informed about the likelihood of being cured and the probabilities of other potential outcomes, including incontinence and impotency, associated with each of these treatments. Conceivably, the patient believes the likelihoods of the different outcomes under the different treatments as facts, and yet finds it difficult to express clear preferences among the treatments because the potential outcomes include states of health that he has never experienced. In other words, it is quite natural that the patient is not clear about his own preferences conditional on the unfortunate events in which one of the bad outcomes obtains. In this instance, the indecisiveness is due to incompleteness of tastes rather than that of beliefs.
Situations that require choice among acts whose payoffs are contingent on events that are more and less familiar, are both important and prevalent. Other than medical decision making, these situations include decisions about health insurance, long-term care insurance, disability insurance, career choice and choice of education, to mention but a few examples. In all of these examples, it is reasonable to suppose that the probabilities of the relevant events are given by the relative frequencies of their occurrence in the population and the incompleteness of the preferences is attribute to incompleteness of tastes.
A different type of acts on which the preference relation may be complete, or incomplete to different degrees, are sets of acts belonging to a "familiar" source. 2 It has been suggested that source preference, or familiarity bias, might explain the observed tendency of investors to forego portfolio diversification in order to invest in what they perceive to be more familiar companies (Heath and Tversky (1991) ) or more familiar institutional environment, leading to domestic bias in financial and other investments, (Huberman (2001)). Rigotti and Shannon (2005) explore the general equilibrium implications, including the indeterminacy of the equilibrium prices and the allocation efficiency, due to incomplete beliefs. 3 More recently, Chew et. al. (2012) provide genetic evidence in support of the view that a sense of familiarity or competence or lack of them, underlie both ambiguity aversion and familiarity bias. In these instances, it is reasonable to suppose that tastes regarding the payoffs of the investments are complete and that source unfamiliarity underlies the incompleteness of beliefs.
Building upon Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , the main results of this paper are representations of incomplete preferences whose restrictions to familiar events and sources are complete. The study of representations of incomplete preferences due lack of familiarity of events, is the subject matter of the next section. Section 3, explores the representations of incomplete preferences due to lack of familiarity of sources. Concluding remarks appear in section 4. The proofs are collected in section 5.
Conditionally Complete Preferences

The analytical framework and basic preference structure
Invoking the analytical framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , let  be a finite set of states and denote  be a finite set of outcomes. Let ∆ () denote the set of all probability measures on  Let  be the set of all functions from  to ∆ ()  Elements of  are referred to as acts.
Under this definition  is a convex subset of the linear space R ||·||  Subsets of  are referred to as events.
Let Â be a binary relation on . The set  is said to be Â-bounded if there exist
The following axioms depict the basic structure of the preference relation Â and are maintained throughout. These axioms are well-known and require no elaboration.
(A.1) (Strict partial order) The preference relation Â is transitive and irreflexive.
The difference between the preference structure above and that of expected utility theory is that the induced relation ¬ ( Â ) is reflexive but not necessarily transitive (hence, it is not necessarily a preorder). Moreover, ¬ ( Â ) and ¬ ( Â ) does not imply that  and  are indifferent, rather they may be incomparable.
For every  ∈  denote by  () := { ∈  |  Â } and  () := { ∈  |  Â } the (strict) upper and lower contour sets of  respectively. The relation Â is said to be convex if the upper contour set is convex. If  is Â-bounded then for  6 =      ,  () and  () have nonempty algebraic interior in the linear space generated by . A binary relation on Â on  satisfying (A.1)-(A.3), is convex. Moreover, the lower contour set is also convex. 4 
Event completeness and conditional dominance
To formalize the idea of conditionally complete preferences I use the following notations. For every event  and acts  and  0 define the act
Denote by Â  the restriction of Â to the subset of act {   0 |  ∈ } Note that (A.1)-(A.3), implies that Â  is well-defined (that is, it is independent of  0 ).
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Define the weak conditional preference relation <  on  as follows: For all
of events is a subjective attribute, revealed by choice. I assume that familiarity of an event  implies completeness of the (weak) preference relation over acts that agree on the unfamiliar event,   :=  −  Definition 1: An event,  is familiar if the conditional preference relation Â  is negatively transitive If  is a familiar event then <  is complete and transitive. 6 The next axiom requires that, conditional on familiar events, the preference relation satisfies state independence. Formally, 4 The proof is by two applications of (A.3). 5 
If  ⊂  is familiar and  itself is not then, for some  0   00 ∈  the acts    0 and    00 are non-comparable. The incompleteness of the conditional preference relation Â   may itself be due to incompleteness of beliefs regarding the likelihoods of the different states in the unfamiliar event and/or to the decision maker's lack of confidence in his own tastes in this event. To represent preference relations that are incomplete on some events, I adopt a modified version of the dominance axiom of Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) . Let  be a familiar event. For each  ∈  let   denote the constant act whose payoff is  () in every state (that is,
To grasp the intuition underlying this assertion, note that for any possible consequence of  in the event    the act      is an element of the lower contour set of     Convexity of the lower contour sets implies that any convex combination of the consequences of     is dominated by     Think of     as representing a set of such combinations whose elements correspond to the implicit set of conditional subjective probability distributions on  that the decision maker might entertain. Since any such combination is dominated by     so is     Formally, (A.5) (Conditional dominance) For the maximal familiar event, and all
Theorem 1 below shows that a preference relation satisfies the axioms (A.1)-(A.5) if and only if there is a non-empty set of utility functions on  and, corresponding to each utility function, a set of probability measures on  such that, when facing a choice between two acts, the decision maker prefers the act that yields higher expected utility according to every utility function and every probability measure in the corresponding set. Moreover, if  is a familiar event then the conditional preference relation, Â   has a subjective expected utility representation and for the corresponding unfamiliar event,    the conditional preference relation, Â    has a multi-prior expected multiutility representation.
To state the theorem I use the following notations: Given a familiar event,
is a nonempty set of real-valued functions on  and, for each  ∈ V ()  Π  is a set of full-support probability measures on  For every real-valued function,  on  and probability measure
Theorem 1 (Representation: Existence) Let Â be a binary relation on , then the following conditions are equivalent:
()  is Â-bounded and Â satisfies (A.1)-(A.5).
() For every familiar event,  there exists a real-valued function on  and a set, Φ ()  of probability-utility pairs such that, for all
and, for all
Moreover, for all   0 ∈ ∪ ∈V Π  and every familiar event,  the conditional probability measures,  (· | ) and
The preference relation depicted above may be thought of as displaying event-dependent incompleteness. This interpretation entails an equivalent formulation of the representation in (1). Let U () : { (·; ) :  → R |  ∈ } be a set of state-dependent utility functions, each of which depends only on the event (that is,  (·; ) =  (·;  0 ) for all   0 ∈  and likewise for the complementary event   ). Moreover, all the elements of U ¡¢ agree on
 is a set of full-support probability measures on  The idea of the proof is as follows: First, use (A.1) -(A.4), the completeness of the weak preference relation on familiar events, and the theorem of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) to obtain a subjective expected utility representation of the preference relation conditional on the familiar event,  Second, invoke (A.5) and modify the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) to obtain a multi-prior expected multi-utility representation of the preference relation conditional on the complementary event,   . Third, use the set of probability measures to link the two representations.
To state the uniqueness properties of the utilities and probabilities that figure in the representation in Theorem 1, I introduce the following additional notations. Let U be a set of real-valued functions on  × . Fix  0 ∈  and for each  ∈ U define a real-valued function, on
Ui the closure of the convex cone in R ||·|| generated by all the functions in b U and . For each ( ) ∈ Φ () that figure in the representation, define a vector  := ( ()  ()) ()∈× in R ||·||  Denote by W the set of all these vectors.
0 is a positive affine transformation of.
The uniqueness result is implied by Lemma 2 in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013). Clearly, the conditional probability measures satisfy
 for every familiar event,  The uniqueness of is implied by the uniqueness part of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem.
In general, is not an element of
Complete beliefs
There are situations in which decision makers rely on experts' assessment of the likelihood of events. For example, in the medical decision problem described in the introduction, the likelihoods of the different outcomes under alternative treatments are provided by the physician. Similarly, accident risks (e.g., airplane crash) are depicted by their empirical distributions. It is reasonable to suppose that, in such cases, the decision maker's beliefs coincide with the empirical distributions and are complete. At the same time, the decision maker may feel unable to compare certain acts whose payoffs are contingent on events outside his realm of experience. For instance, a decision maker who enjoyed good health all his life, may find it difficult to assess the relative merits of long term care insurance policies that include payoffs in the events in which he is disabled and needs professional care.
To model situations of involving complete beliefs and incomplete tastes regarding payoffs contingent on unfamiliar events, I invoke the axiom, dubbed complete beliefs, introduced by Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) . Denote by     the constant act whose payoff is  + (1 − )  in every state.
(A.6) (Complete beliefs) For all events  and  ∈ [0 1]  and constant acts
The next theorem characterizes the representations of preference relations displaying complete beliefs in the presence of familiar events.
Theorem 3 Let Â be a binary relation on , then the following conditions are equivalent:
()  is Â-bounded and Â satisfies (A.1)-(A.6).
() There is a unique probability measure  on  a real-valued function,  on  and for every familiar event,  a nonempty set, V ()  of real-valued functions on  such that, for all
Moreover, is unique up to positive affine transformation, and if U () is another set of functions that represent Â in the sense of (4) 
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 1 above and Theorem 4 of Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), and is omitted.
Source Familiarity
Familiar sources
There is a substantial body of literature dedicated to the proposition that decision makers prefer acts that are measurable with respect to more familiar sources over acts measurable with respect to less familiar sources. To formalize the idea of source familiarity, let T = { 1     } be a partition of  Each such partition is a source. 7 For every partition T = { 1     } let  (T ) be the subset of acts that are T -measurable. 8 For every partition T ,  (T ) with the usual mixture operation is a convex subset of a linear space. 9 Denote by P the set of all partitions of  Definition 2: A familiar source is a partition, T , of the state space such that Â on  (T ) is negatively transitive. A partition that is not a familiar source is an unfamiliar source.
Note that, like familiar events, what constitutes a familiar source is subjective and is revealed by the completeness of the weak preference relation of the subset of acts,  (T )  that are measurable with respect to T . Let T 0 := { ∅} denote the trivial partition, then  (T 0 ) is the subset of all constant acts. 7 Equivalently, a source may be regarded as the algebra generated by a partition. 8 That is,
The mixture operation is defined as follows: for every   ∈  (T )  and
Axioms and representation
Consider the axiom of (unconditional) dominance, of Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) .
Note that dominance implies that the preference relation satisfies (unconditional) state independence. Then, adding dominance to the (A.1) -(A.3) implies the following multi-prior expected utility theorem.
Theorem 4 Let Â be preference relation on  and suppose that T 0 is a familiar source, then the following conditions are equivalent:
()  is Â −bounded and Â satisfies axioms (A.1) -(A.3) and dominance.
() There is a real-valued function  on  unique up to positive affine transformation,  ∈  such that   =      =     and there is a unique, nonempty, convex set, M of probability measures on  such that, for each source, T , and all
Moreover, for every familiar source, T , and all  ∈ T ,  () =  0 () for all   0 ∈ M For any unfamiliar source, T and all  ∈  (T )   is represented by P ∈T () (() · )   ∈ M For any familiar source, T there is a unique source-dependent probability measure  T on  such that, for all  ∈  (T )   is represented by P ∈T  T () (() · )  For every element,  of a partition that defines a familiar source, the subjective probabilities of the states are not unique. However, the sum of the probabilities of all the states in  is unique.
Comparative source familiarity
Distinct sources may be unfamiliar but not necessarily unfamiliar to the same degree. To formalize this idea, I define a relation "more familiar than" on the set of sources in terms of the preferences and characterize it in terms of the set of probabilities.
Following Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , define a binary relation <  on  by: For all   ∈ ,  <   if  Â  implies  Â  for all  ∈  It is possible to show that all the representation results in this paper apply to <  with weak inequalities replacing the strict inequalities.
To define the relation "more familiar than" I use the following notations and definitions: Let B be a binary relation on  defined as follows:
This act is referred to as a bet on  For every
The idea captured by the definition of B is that, for each constant act   and bets  and such that  B   B, the pair of outcomes () spans of the gulf between the bets on an  that are just comparable to    The presumption is that the less familiar is the source, the bigger is the gulf that needs to be spanned, for every bet on event  0 belonging to that source. To make sure that the measurements of these gulfs is based on the same scale, the "upper bet," , is fixed. Formally, Definition 3: A source T is more familiar than a source T 0 if for each  ∈ T and  0 ∈ T 0 and all
The following theorem characterizes the relation "more familiar than" in terms of the probability measures that figure in the representation. This characterization entails a monotone likelihood ratio property, namely, one source is more familiar than another if the likelihood ratio of the highest and lowest probabilities of each event belonging to the more familiar source is smaller than the corresponding likelihood ratio of every event belonging to the less familiar source.
Theorem 5. Let Â be an Archimedean strict partial order on  satisfying independence and dominance Suppose that  is Â-bounded and that T 0 is a familiar source. Then source T is more familiar than another source,
Increasing source familiarity
Presumably, familiarity grows with experience. As sources become more familiar the preference relation become less incomplete. The following definition captures this idea by providing a choice-based formalization of a source being more familiar according to one preference relation than according to another. Definition 4: A source T is more familiar according to the preference relation Â than according to the preference relation
The next theorem characterizes the notion that a source is more familiar according to one preference relation than according to another. It asserts that, under the aforementioned axioms, this relation is equivalent to the set of probability measures that figure in the evaluation of acts corresponding to the former preference relation is contained in that of the latter. Let M Â denote the set of probability measures on  that figure in the representation of Â in Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. Let Â and Â 0 be Archimedean strict partial orders on  satisfying independence and dominance Suppose that  is Â and Â 0 bounded, and that T 0 is a familiar source. Then T is more familiar under Â than under Â 0 if and only if
Â } It is natural to suppose that as T becomes more familiar, the range  Â T () shrinks, for all  ∈ T  This implies that M Â must be trimmed to accommodate the tighter ranges  Â T (). In the extreme, that is, ifT is a familiar source then, for each  ∈T ,  Â T () reduces to a singleton set This implies that M Â must consist of probability measures that agree on the events inT .
Building on Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and departing from their uncertainty aversion axiom, Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) advance a model of choice in which they separate ambiguity from ambiguity attitude. One of the primitives of their model is a complete preference relations on Anscombe and Aumann (1963) acts. From this they derive an incomplete preference relations representing "unambiguous" preferences. According to their approach, an act  is (weakly) unambiguously preferred over another act  if and only if the subjective expected utility of the former is at least as great as that of the latter, for every probability measure belonging to a convex and closed set of priors. A derived preference relation < * 1 is said to reveal more ambiguity than another derived preference relation < * 
Proofs
Proof of theorem 1 (outline)
The proof invokes results and arguments from the proof of Theorem 1 in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , properly modified to accommodate the conditional preferences.
() ⇒ ()  For every event,  the sets of acts that agree on the complementary event (that is, the sets {{   |  ∈ } |  ∈ }) are convex. 10 For familiar events,  the conditional preference relation, <   is a weak order (i.e., transitive and complete binary relation) satisfying the weak version of (A.3). Moreover, since Â  6 = ∅, by (A.4) and the theorem of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , there is a real-valued function, on , and a unique (conditional) probability measure, on  such that, for all   ∈   <   if and only if P ∈ ()
 is unique up to positive affine transformation and is unique.
Define an auxiliary binary relation 3 on  as follows:
However, because the weights on consequences in each state add up to 1  can also be seen as a point in R (||−1)·|| . For any act  ∈  the corresponding act in R (||−1)·|| is denoted by ( ). Thus,  : R ||·|| → R (||−1)·|| is a one-to-one linear mapping. Define () := {( − ) |  3  and   ∈  and   0} Then () is a closed convex cone with non-empty interior in  (||−1)·|| . By theorem V.9.8 in Dunford and Schwartz (1957) , there is a dense set,  in its boundary such that each point of  has a unique tangent. Let W  be the collection of all the supporting hyperplanes corresponding to this dense set. Without loss of generality, we assume that each function in W  has unit normal vector. Then
for all  ∈  By an argument analogous to Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , it can be shown that (A.5) is equivalent to the following con-
The proof that the component functions, {  } ∈   of each essential function,  ∈ W   are positive linear transformations of one another (that is, if  ∈ W  then for all non-null   ∈   ,(· ) and(· ) are positive linear transformations of one another) is analogous to that of Lemma 6 in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) .
The representation is implied by the following arguments: 12 If there are kinks in  so that there are more than one supporting hyperplane then, by the same argument as in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , there is at least one  that can be expressed as a limit point of sequence {  } from W   Then the component functions of  are positive linear transformation of one another. Add all those 's to W   then the new set of functions will represent Â 
Let
     0 ∈ ∪ ∈V Π   then,   ( | ) = () =   0 ( | )  ∀ ∈  Thus,   (· | ) =   0 (· | ) = (·) Σ  0 ∈ ( 0 )  for every familiar event  ¥
Proof of theorem 4
(Sufficiency) Since T 0 is a familiar source, the restriction of < to the subset of constant acts is complete. Hence, by Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , Theorem 3, there is a real-valued function,  on  unique up to positive affine transformation and a convex nonempty set, M of probability measures on (5) is implied by (7) and (6) is an implication of Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) .
Let T be a familiar source then  (T ) is a convex subset of a linear space. The restriction of < to  (T ) is a weak order satisfying (A.2), the weak version of (A.3) and, by Lemma 2 in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), it satisfies state independence. Hence, by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) there exist a unique  T such that T , for all  , ∈  (T )   Â  if and only if
(Necessity) The necessity is implied by Theorem 3 in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) . ¥
Proof of theorem 5
Let Â be preference relation on  satisfying the conditions in the hypothesis of the theorem Suppose that  is Â-bounded and that T 0 is a familiar source.
Suppose that T is a more familiar source than T 0  Let  ∈ T and  0 ∈ T 0 , fix a bet on   Without loss of generality, normalize the utility function so that
and and
But (8) and (9) implȳ
Now, 0 ≺  if and only if  ( 0 )   ()  Thus (10) holds if and only if
¥
Proof of theorem 6
Let Â and Â 0 be preference relations on  satisfying the conditions in the hypothesis of the theorem Suppose that  is Â and Â 0 bounded and that T 0 is a familiar source.
(Necessity) Fix a source T and let Â and Â 0 be preference relations on  such that T is more familiar according to Â than according to Â 0  Take any   ∈  (T ) such that  Â 0  By Theorem 4, there exists an real-valued affine function  0 on ∆ () and a convex set of probability measures, M 
Then, by Definition 4, (15) implies
Moreover, (15) and (16) imply that  0 ≤ . For a different choice of bets, by the same argument, it can be shown that 0 ≥ Hence, for all  ∈ T , { ()
Since
By Theorem 4, (18) implies  Â  Thus, by Definition 4, T is more familiar under Â than under Â 0  ¥
